On 9 October, the European Commission designated 46 new strategic projects, bringing the total to 106 including projects outside the EU. A designation is progress, but it does not tell us which plants will secure funding or how much qualified material they will deliver.
MITUXA view: Europe risks diversifying the origin of its ore without diversifying the stages that make it usable. Rare-earth concentrate is not a permanent magnet. And strategic importance does not make a refinery profitable.
The bottleneck lies beyond the mine
The Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 capacity benchmarks equivalent to at least 10% of EU annual consumption for extraction, 40% for processing and 25% for recycling of strategic raw materials. It also seeks to limit reliance on any one third country to 65% for an individual strategic raw material at any relevant processing stage. These are targets, not installed capacity.
The IEA’s 2026 outlook illustrates the gap. Outside the leading producer, announced projects could provide nearly 50,000 tonnes of rare-earth mining capacity by 2035, versus less than 40,000 tonnes of refining and separation capacity and around 18,000 tonnes in metals, alloys and magnets, measured in rare-earth content. These are global figures outside the leading producer, not forecasts for the EU or guaranteed output.
Europe’s October selection includes eight extraction projects, 11 processing projects, 19 recycling projects and eight integrated projects. The test now is whether these investments fit together. A separation plant needs both dependable feedstock and buyers able to use its output.
Who pays for resilience?
In projects studied by the IEA, refining capital costs were 20% to more than 150% higher outside the dominant supplier. Operating costs were around 50% higher on average. These are not estimates for every European plant, but they explain why diversification may be strategically valuable and commercially difficult, especially when world prices fall.
Faster permits help get projects built. Grants reduce upfront costs. Stocks cushion temporary disruptions. None guarantees customers at prices that cover costs over a cycle. Multi-year offtake contracts, volume commitments and, in some cases, price floors can make a project financeable. They do not eliminate the premium: they allocate it among industrial buyers, producers and taxpayers. The RESourceEU action plan includes coordination of purchases and stockpiling. The question is who bears each risk.
La Rochelle: progress, not yet proof of returns
Solvay announced €15–20 million of investment to expand rare-earth separation at La Rochelle. It also signed a long-term agreement with Viridis to source material from Brazil, with first deliveries expected in 2028. A supply contract is more tangible than a capacity announcement, but does not guarantee the timetable or returns.
Watch feedstock reliability, customer qualification and offtake terms. A plant can work technically while falling short on utilisation or margins. Even a successful operation needs to be assessed against its contribution to Solvay’s group earnings before drawing conclusions about the shares.
What MITUXA will monitor in 2027
- Final investment decisions: financing secured, construction started and a credible commissioning schedule.
- Contracts on both sides of the plant: dependable input volumes, committed buyers and clear terms for a downturn in global prices.
- Tonnes delivered and approved: customer-qualified shipments rather than nameplate capacity. Recycling projects also need enough available scrap to run economically.
Bottom line: Europe does not need to mine everything at home. It needs alternatives at the stages where disruption would stop its factories. For investors, the first filter is not the strategic label: it is whether a project can secure inputs, customers and margins when global prices fall.
Independent research for information and education. Not personalised financial advice or a recommendation to buy or sell.